Markets & competition · Reference · November 2026

UK corporate governance and financial reporting

From the Cadbury Report to Modernising Corporate Reporting, 1992–2026

For more than three decades Britain has governed its listed companies chiefly through codes applied on “comply or explain”, not through statute. Each review widened what boards must disclose: from the board and its accounts, through executive pay and institutional investors, to stakeholders, risk and audit. The statutory core beneath it changed little. A regulator on a statutory footing was recommended in 2018 and promised in 2021; in January 2026 the government dropped the bill to create it. In September 2026 it opened a consultation on simplifying corporate reporting.

83
recommendations in the Kingman review of the Financial Reporting Council
Kingman, December 2018
64
recommendations in the Brydon review of audit quality and effectiveness
Brydon, December 2019
150+
recommendations from the three post-Carillion reviews answered by the 2021 white paper
BEIS, March 2021
0
statutory audit, reporting and governance regulators created: the bill was dropped in January 2026
Written answer UIN 107109, January 2026
25%
cut in administrative burdens sought by the Modernising Corporate Reporting consultation
Department for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade, September 2026

Timeline of reviews, codes and policy papers

Official and quasi-official documents in order of publication, with links to the full text. Codes are in bold. Where the issuing body no longer hosts a document, the link goes to a stable archive: the Cadbury Archive at Cambridge Judge Business School (JBS), the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) or the National Archives.

DateDocumentIssued byFull text
Before Cadbury: precursors, 1975–1988
Jul 1975The Corporate Report: A Discussion Paper. It sought to be the starting point for a major review of the users, purposes and methods of financial reporting, and addressed reports to a wide range of users, employees among them.Accounting Standards Steering Committee (ICAEW)ICAEW (full text)
Jul 1977The Future of Company Reports (Green Paper, Cmnd 6888). The CBI opposed its proposals for wider disclosure.Department of TradeHansard, publication · Hansard, responses (no online full text located)
Nov 1977The Conduct of Company Directors (White Paper, Cmnd 7037). It proposed a statutory statement of directors' duties that would require directors to take into account the interests of employees, and was carried into the Companies Bill of 1978.Department of TradeHansard, publication · Hansard, Companies Bill (no online full text located)
Apr 1987Code of Recommended Practice on Non-Executive Directors, sent to every listed company with a covering letter from Sir Nicholas Goodison, chairman of The Stock Exchange. PRO NED's chairman from mid-1984 was Sir Adrian Cadbury, who went on to chair the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance.PRO NED (Promotion of Non-Executive Directors), sponsored by the Bank of England and City bodiesBank of England (PDF) · Bank of England, 1993 history (PDF)
1988The Making of Accounting Standards: Report of the Review Committee (Dearing). The government supported its recommendations, including the creation of a Financial Reporting Council and an Accounting Standards Board.Review committee chaired by Sir Ron Dearing; report addressed to the Consultative Committee of Accountancy BodiesHansard, government support (no online full text located)
Foundations: the board and its accounts
Dec 1992Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury), with the Code of Best PracticeCommittee set up by the FRC, the London Stock Exchange and the accountancy professionFRC (PDF) · JBS
Dec 1994Internal Control and Financial Reporting: Guidance for Directors of Listed Companies Registered in the UK (Rutteman)Working group of the Hundred Group, ICAEW and ICASICAEW summary (no online full text located)
Jul 1995Directors' Remuneration: Report of a Study Group (Greenbury)Study group established by the CBIJBS (PDF, scanned)
Jan 1998Committee on Corporate Governance: Final Report (Hampel)Committee set up on the initiative of the FRC chairmanJBS (PDF)
Jun 1998The Combined Code: Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best PracticeHampel Committee; disclosure required by the Stock Exchange's Listing RulesFRC (PDF)
Sep 1999Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code (Turnbull)ICAEW Internal Control Working PartyJBS (PDF)
Company law, independence and the investment chain
Mar 1998 – Jul 2001Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report (Company Law Review)Independent steering group commissioned by the DTIBackground in the Companies Act 2006 explanatory notes (no online full text located)
Mar 2001Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review (Myners)Review for HM TreasuryNational Archives (PDF)
Jan 2003Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-executive Directors (Higgs)Review for the DTIECGI (PDF)
Jan 2003Audit Committees: Combined Code Guidance (Smith)Group appointed by the FRCECGI (PDF)
Jun 2003The Tyson Report on the Recruitment and Development of Non-executive DirectorsLondon Business School, for the DTILBS repository
Jul 2003The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (revised)FRCJBS (PDF)
2005Internal Control: Revised Guidance for Directors (Turnbull revised)FRCJBS (PDF)
2006Companies Act 2006, including the codified directors' duties (section 172: duty to promote the success of the company)Parliamentlegislation.gov.uk, s.172
2006, 2008Combined Code, further editionsFRC2006 · 2008 (JBS, PDF)
The financial crisis and stewardship
Nov 2009A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities (Walker)Independent reviewReport · Recommendations (JBS, PDF)
Jun 2010The UK Corporate Governance Code (the Combined Code renamed)FRCECGI (PDF)
Jul 2010The UK Stewardship CodeFRCFRC (PDF)
Feb 2011Women on Boards (Davies)Review for BISGOV.UK (PDF)
Jun 2012Going Concern and Liquidity Risks: Lessons for Companies and Auditors (Sharman)Panel of inquiry set up by the FRCFRC (PDF)
Jul 2012The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision MakingReview for BISGOV.UK (PDF)
Sep 2012UK Corporate Governance Code 2012 and UK Stewardship Code 2012FRCCode (ECGI) · Stewardship (FRC)
Jan 2013 – Apr 2014Three consultations on implementing the Sharman recommendations on going concern, which led to the viability statementFRC Codes and Standards CommitteeFRC announcement, Sep 2014
Feb, Jun 2014Responses to the FRC on going concern and the proposed viability statementThe 100 Group of Finance DirectorsFeb 2014 (PDF) · Jun 2014 (PDF)
Sep 2014UK Corporate Governance Code 2014, introducing the longer-term viability statement (C.2.2), with the FRC's Guidance on Risk Management, Internal Control and Related Financial and Business ReportingFRCECGI (PDF)
Apr 2016UK Corporate Governance Code 2016, reflecting the EU audit legislationFRCECGI (PDF)
Purpose and stakeholders
Nov 2016Corporate Governance Reform: Green PaperBEISGOV.UK (PDF)
Aug 2017Corporate Governance Reform: Government Response to the Green Paper ConsultationBEISGOV.UK (PDF)
Oct 2017A Report into the Ethnic Diversity of UK Boards (Parker)Independent reviewGOV.UK
Nov 2017Lab Project Report: Risk and Viability ReportingFRC Financial Reporting LabFRC
2017, 2020Corporate Governance Review: annual analysis of FTSE 350 annual reports, including viability statementsGrant Thornton Governance Institute2017 (PDF) · 2020 (PDF)
Nov 2017Hampton-Alexander Review: Improving Gender Balance in FTSE Leadership (2017 report)Independent reviewGOV.UK (PDF)
Jul 2018UK Corporate Governance Code 2018FRCFRC (PDF)
2018The Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018 (SI 2018/860)Parliamentlegislation.gov.uk
Dec 2018The Wates Corporate Governance Principles for Large Private CompaniesCoalition group chaired by James Wates, with the FRCECGI (PDF) · FRC
Audit, the regulator and retrenchment
Dec 2018Independent Review of the Financial Reporting Council (Kingman)Review for BEISGOV.UK (PDF)
Mar 2019Independent Review of the Financial Reporting Council: Initial Consultation on the RecommendationsBEISGOV.UK (PDF)
Apr 2019Statutory Audit Services Market Study: Final ReportCompetition and Markets AuthorityGOV.UK (PDF)
Oct 2019The UK Stewardship Code 2020FRCFRC (PDF)
Dec 2019Assess, Assure and Inform: Improving Audit Quality and Effectiveness (Brydon)Review for BEISReport · Recommendations (GOV.UK, PDF)
Mar 2021Restoring Trust in Audit and Corporate Governance (CP 382): the government's response to Kingman, the CMA and BrydonBEISGOV.UK (PDF)
Jul 2021Response to Restoring Trust in Audit and Corporate Governance, including the resilience statementThe 100 Group of Finance DirectorsPDF
Sep 2021Thematic Review: Viability and Going ConcernFRC Corporate Reporting ReviewFRC (PDF)
May 2022Restoring Trust in Audit and Corporate Governance: Government ResponseBEISGOV.UK (PDF)
Sep 2023Response to the FRC's consultation on revising the UK Corporate Governance CodeThe 100 Group of Finance DirectorsPDF
Jan 2024UK Corporate Governance Code 2024 (in force 2025; Provision 29 from 2026)FRCFRC (PDF)
Jun 2025UK Stewardship Code 2026 (in force 1 January 2026)FRCFRC (PDF)
Jan 2026Decision not to proceed with the Audit Reform and Corporate Governance BillDepartment for Business and TradeWritten answer UIN 107109
Sep 2026Modernising Corporate Reporting to Support Long-Term Economic Growth (consultation, closes 30 November 2026)Department for Business, Innovation, Science and TradeGOV.UK (PDF)

What each review did

The reviews fall into five phases. Each widened the regime's reach; few added to its statutory force.

Foundations, 1992–1999

Cadbury (1992) defined corporate governance as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled”. Its lasting device was enforcement by disclosure: the Stock Exchange required listed companies to state whether they complied with the Code and to explain any departure. It favoured separating chairman and chief executive, required at least three non-executives, and recommended audit and remuneration committees and directors' reports on internal control and going concern.

Rutteman (1994) gave directors guidance on reporting on internal financial control; Turnbull superseded it once companies adopted the new guidance in full.

Greenbury (1995), set up by the CBI, addressed directors' pay. Its remedies survive in the 1998 Combined Code: remuneration committees of independent non-executives, notice periods of a year or less, and disclosure of each director's pay by name.

Hampel (1998) warned against treating the codes as prescriptive rules checked for literal compliance, and held that the board's first responsibility is to enhance the prosperity of the business over time. The Combined Code consolidated Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel and introduced the two-part disclosure still in use. Turnbull (1999) made the review of internal control risk-based and annual.

Company law, independence and investors, 1998–2008

The Company Law Review, commissioned by the DTI in March 1998, presented its Final Report on 26 July 2001. Its work underlies the Companies Act 2006, which codified directors' duties: section 172 requires a director to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, having regard to employees, suppliers and customers, the community and the environment, and the long term.

Myners (2001) found pension trustees taking investment decisions without the resources or expertise to do so. Higgs (2003) recommended that at least half the board, excluding the chair, be independent non-executives, set a single test of independence, and recorded that women held 6% of non-executive posts. Smith (2003) wrote the guidance for audit committees; Tyson (2003) addressed how to widen the pool of non-executives.

The financial crisis and stewardship, 2009–2016

Walker (2009) proposed board risk committees in banks and a Stewardship Code for institutional investors. The 2010 Code introduced annual re-election of FTSE 350 directors and regard for gender diversity; the Stewardship Code followed a month later.

Davies (2011) set a target of 25% women on FTSE 100 boards by 2015. Sharman (2012) asked that going-concern assessments address solvency as well as liquidity. Kay (2012) concluded that short-termism is a problem in UK equity markets and made seventeen recommendations. The 2014 Code added the longer-term viability statement, discussed below as a key issue, and clawback provisions.

Purpose and stakeholders, 2016–2018

The 2016 green paper and the 2017 response addressed executive pay, the voice of employees and other stakeholders, and governance in large private companies, and expressly ruled out amending section 172. SI 2018/860 then required a section 172(1) statement, pay-ratio reporting and governance statements from very large companies, which the Wates Principles were written to serve.

The 2018 Code asked boards to pursue long-term sustainable success while contributing to wider society, to engage with the workforce, and to cap chair tenure at nine years. Hampton-Alexander and Parker set voluntary targets for women and for directors from minority ethnic groups.

Audit, the regulator and retrenchment, 2018–2026

Kingman (2018) made 83 recommendations, chief among them replacing the FRC with a statutory Audit, Reporting and Governance Authority (ARGA). The government accepted that aim and consulted on the recommendations in March 2019. The CMA reported on competition in audit in April 2019. Brydon (2019) made 64 recommendations, including a resilience statement, an audit and assurance policy and executive attestation on internal controls.

The 2021 white paper was the government's response to all three. The 2022 response confirmed ARGA but left internal controls to the Code, and the 2024 Code's Provision 29 now requires a board declaration on material controls. In January 2026 the government dropped the bill; the FRC awaits a statutory footing “as soon as parliamentary time allows”.

Key issue

The longer-term viability statement

The 2014 Code asked boards, for the first time, to look beyond the twelve months of the going-concern test: to explain how they had assessed the company's prospects, over what period and why, and to state whether they reasonably expected it to continue in operation and meet its liabilities over that period. Its history shows the regime's characteristic pattern: a review's recommendation, negotiated down in consultation, then judged by the quality of what companies actually report.

Origins, 2012–2014

Sharman (2012) asked that the going-concern assessment address solvency as well as liquidity. The work fell to the FRC's Codes and Standards Committee, chaired from March 2012 until January 2015 by Jim Sutcliffe, an actuary (Fellow of the Institute of Actuaries) who had been Group Chief Executive of Old Mutual and was Chairman of Sun Life Financial, with Melanie McLaren as the FRC's Executive Director, Codes and Standards. The committee consulted three times, in January 2013, November 2013 and April 2014. Its first proposals, which extended the meaning of going concern, met a barrage of criticism. The scheme published in September 2014 kept the going-concern basis of accounting separate and added a viability statement looking forward significantly longer than twelve months, over a period each board would choose.

Preparers against, investors for

The Hundred Group of Finance Directors welcomed the separation of solvency and liquidity risk from going concern in February 2014, but told the FRC in June 2014 that it did not support the viability statement, which it expected to be “boiler plate disclosure that adds little” for investors. Investors pressed the other way: nine of them, including LGIM, Royal London and the Local Authority Pension Fund Forum, wrote to the Financial Times that the April 2014 draft would water the statement down, contrary to Sharman's aims. The FRC kept its wording.

What companies reported

Grant Thornton's annual FTSE 350 Corporate Governance Review, led by Simon Lowe as chair of the Grant Thornton Governance Institute, tracked the result. In 2017, 81% of companies chose a three-year period and 51% gave little or no insight into their viability. The FRC's Financial Reporting Lab reported that investors wanted to know how boards assessed prospects, how principal risks were considered and what stress testing lay behind the statement, and urged companies to be “bolder”. By 2020, 68% of statements were good or detailed, up from 56% a year earlier, which Grant Thornton attributed to COVID-19, Kingman's criticism and the FRC's attention. The FRC's thematic review followed in September 2021.

Reform proposed, then abandoned

Kingman (2018) proposed that viability statements be reviewed and reformed, and that serious consideration be given to abolishing them if they could not be made effective. Brydon and the government then proposed a statutory resilience statement for the largest public interest entities, covering the short, medium and long term and subsuming the viability and going-concern statements. The Hundred Group supported it in 2021 as a replacement for viability reporting, while opposing a fixed five-year period, mandatory reverse stress tests and checklist disclosures. The FRC's 2023 consultation proposed aligning the viability provision with the expected resilience statement; the 2024 Code instead left the existing provision in place. The resilience statement fell with the bill in January 2026.

The related fight over internal controls

In September 2023 the Hundred Group called the FRC's proposed board declaration on risk management and internal controls “not proportionate”, asking that it cover financial-reporting controls only, be given by executives and be made at the balance-sheet date. The 2024 Code's Provision 29 requires a declaration on the effectiveness of material controls at the balance-sheet date.

Where it stands

The statement survives in Provision 31 of the 2024 Code, its period still chosen by each board. The September 2026 consultation describes the Code's longer-term prospects assessment, “generally three years”, as part of existing risk reporting (paragraph 168).

Open consultation · closes 30 November 2026

Modernising Corporate Reporting

On 7 September 2026 the government opened a twelve-week consultation of sixty questions intended to make the UK's corporate reporting framework “the most proportionate and effective in the world” and to cut administrative burdens by 25%. Several of its proposals would reverse disclosures added by the reviews above.

Stakeholders

Replace the section 172(1) statement introduced in 2018 with a baseline disclosure on resources and relationships, including how relationships affected board decisions.

Governance reporting

Move corporate governance reporting from company to group level, and ask whether private companies should report on governance at all.

Remuneration

Remove items including the CEO pay ratio and the report on the remuneration committee's work, and ask whether to drop the annual advisory vote on the remuneration report.

Strategic report and accounts

Replace prescriptive strategic-report content with principles, move detail from the Companies Act into accounting standards, and replace capital-maintenance rules with a solvency-based test for distributions.

The consultation paper does not mention ARGA, the abandoned bill or the FRC's statutory footing. Futuresphere is preparing a response, together with a paper on the legal basis and duties of Modernising Corporate Reporting.

Read the consultation paper Our response: in preparation

Nine threads since 1992

Most threads show one pattern: a problem named in a review, met by a disclosure obligation, tightened by later Code provisions, while the legal duties beneath it change little.

1. Comply or explain, and the fear of box-ticking

Cadbury's listing obligation to disclose compliance, rather than a legal duty to comply, has survived every revision, and so has the anxiety about formalism: Hampel in 1998, the 2018 Code's warning against a tick-box approach, the 2024 Code's outcomes-based reporting and the FRC's March 2026 paper on the quality of explanations. The design depends on investors reading and acting on what companies explain.

2. Dispersing power on the board

From Cadbury's separation of chairman and chief executive “in principle”, through Higgs's independent half of the board, to annual re-election in 2010 and a nine-year cap on chair tenure in 2018. Each step remains a Code provision from which a company may depart with an explanation.

3. Executive pay: disclosure and process, not levels

Greenbury's remedy was independent committees and disclosure by name; later layers added clawback (2014), pay ratios (2018), pension alignment (2018) and disclosure of malus and clawback (2024). None of the reviews listed here proposed capping or directly regulating pay. The 2026 consultation proposes removing the pay ratio.

4. From control statements to a board declaration

Cadbury's report on internal control (1992), Rutteman (1994), Turnbull (1999), risk appetite (2010), the viability statement (2014), Brydon's proposed executive attestation (2019) and Provision 29 (2026). The UK chose a board declaration on comply or explain where Sarbanes-Oxley in the United States imposes legal requirements on the chief executive and finance director.

5. Shareholders as the enforcement mechanism

Cadbury asked institutions to press companies to comply; Myners found trustees under-resourced; Walker proposed a Stewardship Code; Kay found markets favouring exit over voice. The Stewardship Codes of 2010, 2012, 2020 and 2026 followed, the last explicitly aimed at reducing reporting burdens. The regime relies for enforcement on investors whose own decision-making Myners and Kay found wanting.

6. From shareholders towards stakeholders, and back?

Hampel held directors accountable to shareholders. The Companies Act 2006 required directors to have regard to stakeholders; the 2018 Code and SI 2018/860 required boards to report how they did so. The 2017 response declined to amend section 172 itself. The 2026 consultation would replace the section 172(1) statement: the shift has been in what boards report, not to whom they answer.

7. Board diversity by voluntary targets

Higgs recorded that women held 6% of non-executive posts. Davies (25% by 2015), Hampton-Alexander (33% by 2020) and Parker (at least one director from a minority ethnic group on each FTSE 100 board by 2021) set targets without quotas, and the FRC has identified transparency as an important driver of change.

8. Self-regulation and the unfinished regulator

The regime began in a committee of the FRC, the Exchange and the accountancy profession, and its reviews came from an industry body, a professional body and the FRC as well as government. Kingman judged the FRC's lack of a clear statutory base “very unusual for a regulator”. ARGA was promised in 2019, 2021 and 2022 and dropped in 2026. With the targeted 2024 Code, the lighter 2026 Stewardship Code and the 2026 consultation, the latest phase turns from adding obligations to removing them.

9. The longer-term viability statement

Introduced in 2014 to make boards look beyond twelve months, it was opposed by the Hundred Group and defended by investors. Grant Thornton's reviews and the FRC's Lab found mostly three-year and often uninformative statements, improving after 2019. Kingman proposed reform or abolition, and the resilience statement meant to replace it fell with the bill in 2026. Its period is still left to each board, and the 2026 consultation describes the assessment as generally three years.

Guides for interpretation

The FRC's guidance explains how boards are expected to apply the Code; it does not set out a single right way to do so.

Every link was checked on 20 November 2026. The Hundred Group's positions are taken from its own published responses; press reports are cited only for the reception of the 2013–2014 consultations. Greenbury's online copies are scanned images; no online full text of the Rutteman guidance or the Company Law Review's Final Report was located. The 2010–2016 Codes are linked through ECGI because no FRC-hosted copy was found.