How we bring about change
Britain does not lack policy research. Think tanks, universities, the National Audit Office, the Office for Budget Responsibility and select committees produce a great deal of it. Yet failures of the kind that Anthony King and Ivor Crewe catalogued in The Blunders of Our Governments (2013) continue to recur. In our view the constraint is not the supply of analysis. Good analysis rarely reaches those who decide in a form they can use; it is not taught to those who will decide next; and it is too seldom understood by the public, whose consent sustains both.
How ideas have changed policy before
Ideas change policy through institutions that persist, educate and communicate over decades. The Fabian Society, founded in 1884, helped to found the London School of Economics, which opened in 1895, and Fabians helped to found the Labour Party in 1900 (Fabian Society; LSE). Half a century later Friedrich Hayek argued that public opinion is shaped less by original thinkers than by those he called "second-hand dealers in ideas": the teachers, journalists and commentators who transmit them (Hayek 1949). Antony Fisher, advised by Hayek to stay out of politics and reach the intellectuals with reasoned argument, founded the Institute of Economic Affairs in 1955 (IEA).
Both precedents carry a lesson and a warning. The lesson is that research, education and communication succeed together, and over long horizons. The warning is that an institution built to advance one doctrine can entrench its errors as effectively as its insights. We mean to keep the first and avoid the second. We are non-partisan; we work from a synthesis of traditions, not from any one of them; and our method requires that every claim be tested against history and evidence, not defended because it is ours.
Four stages
Research and fluency. Rigorous, first-principles work that redefines the terms of a debate, instead of taking a new position within the old terms, joined to real fluency in economics.
Absorption by those who decide. The new terms are taken up by several groups at once (political, official, business, media and academic) through colloquia, briefings and advocacy, and through short courses for officials.
Distillation. The terms reach a wider audience through academic publication, policy, and secondary media, including XPLN Media, without the simplification that turns argument into slogan.
Public inheritance. The public comes to treat the new terms as the terms of debate itself. That is a deeper change than winning any single argument, and education makes it last.
How opinion moves: elite, attentive and mass
Public opinion is not one evenly distributed thing. It helps to distinguish three tiers: a small policy-making elite; a larger attentive public of engaged and informed citizens; and a largely inattentive mass public, which receives opinion in simplified, cue-dependent form (Almond 1950). Influence seldom passes directly from the media to the mass public; it passes through opinion leaders in the attentive public, who interpret it for those around them (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955). Whether elites are united or divided on a question matters more than the volume of effort aimed at the public: when elites are united, the attentive public, and through it the wider public, tends to follow; when they are divided, persuasion meets resistance founded on prior values (Zaller 1992). We therefore direct argument first at policy academics and policy elites, rely on the attentive public to carry it onward, time our advocacy to the moments when policy can change, and sustain it over several years. Persuasion has limits: opinion led by elites cannot be held indefinitely against events, and a division left to persist on a salient question can harden into an identity that argument no longer moves, as the Brexit case illustrates.
Read the full account: Explicating a Coherent Theory of Change (Futuresphere Unbound, Part 9) →
What we carry along that chain
Beyond state against market. A mixed economy is a fact of life. The useful question, answerable case by case, is which institutions (public, private or mixed) best serve a given purpose.
Policy matched to the nature of the good. Whether a good is rival, whether people can be excluded from it, and whether its risks can be pooled should shape how it is provided (Samuelson 1954; Musgrave 1959; Ostrom 1990).
Fair procedure and fair outcome. Both are necessary tests of justice; neither is sufficient alone. This is the ground of crito-liberalism, our critical, liberal and pragmatic synthesis.
Together they give us our position: liberal, democratic and non-partisan; pro-competitive rather than "pro-market", favouring markets where market failure is neither expected nor observed, and pragmatic correction, regulation included, where it is.
What makes the approach different
We treat implementation as part of the work. Every colloquium ends in a plan of action, and we track whether it is carried out. Our advocacy addresses how a policy is to be delivered, as well as what it should be. And we treat the preparation of those who govern as a lever in its own right, instead of leaving it to institutions whose curricula change slowly.
How we will judge ourselves
We will judge the work at each of the four stages. Influence on policy is rarely attributable to any single actor, and the later stages take years to show, so we will report what we can show at each stage, and claim no more.