Problem diagnosis

Storm clouds are gathering

Storm clouds are gathering: not over Europe alone, as in 1938, but over most of the systems on which a liberal democracy depends. Britain faces several crises at once, and they have become entangled: war in Europe and in the Gulf, public debt at a level last seen in the early 1960s, a decade and a half of weak productivity growth, an ageing population, financially fragile universities and a state that struggles to deliver its own programmes (ONS 2026; OBR 2026; Office for Students 2026).

These crises arrive in the midst of a transformation of production that Alvin Toffler compared with the agricultural and industrial revolutions (Toffler 1980). In our judgement, public debate has yet to come to terms with what it implies for work, for the state and for democratic politics.

Citizens have noticed. Across twelve high-income democracies, median satisfaction with the way democracy is working fell from 49 per cent in 2021 to 36 per cent in 2024 (Wike and Fetterolf 2024). Many are turning to nationalist populists, who offer simple explanations and promise decisive action. We argue that this is the greatest internal threat to open, liberal democracies.

The symptoms are familiar. The causes are less often examined, and our understanding of them frames everything the Initiative proposes.

Polycrisis

We use the definition developed at the Cascade Institute: a global polycrisis occurs when crises in multiple global systems "become causally entangled in ways that significantly degrade humanity's prospects", so that together they do more harm than the sum of their separate harms (Lawrence, Janzwood and Homer-Dixon 2022). Crises entangle in three ways: through common stresses that weaken several systems at once; through domino effects, in which a crisis in one system alters the stresses on another; and through feedbacks that loop back and escalate each (Lawrence et al. 2024).

Our premise is that political economy, the ideas, institutions and people through which a society decides how to produce, distribute and govern, is one of the entangled systems. The claim is bounded. We do not hold that political economy caused the pandemic or the wars in Ukraine and the Gulf. We hold that the British state has repeatedly turned such shocks into worse outcomes than the knowledge available at the time made necessary, and that it has generated some shocks of its own, as in the gilt-market crisis of September 2022 (Bank of England 2023).

Who has lost

Between 1988 and 2008 the largest gains in real income went to those near the middle of the global distribution, nine-tenths of them in Asia, while those around the 85th percentile, most of them in the mature economies, gained least (Lakner and Milanovic 2013). The picture is less stark once allowance is made for changes in the countries and populations measured, and domestic policy explains as much as global forces (Corlett 2016). It remains true that many in the lower middle classes of rich countries believe, with some justification, that the system has not served them, and it is to them that nationalist populists most directly appeal.

The causes we aim to address

The weakening of truth as a norm in politics. Where claims need not be true to be effective, democratic norms and institutions can be discarded at little political cost.

Disengagement more than echo chambers. Online echo chambers are much less widespread than is commonly assumed, and algorithmic selection tends slightly to widen, not narrow, the news people see (Ross Arguedas et al. 2022). The larger problem is disengagement: in Britain, interest in news has almost halved since 2015, and selective avoidance of news is rising (Newman et al. 2024). Many who still follow the news want context and explanation that news-only formats rarely provide.

Expertise that does not reach decisions. Britain spends heavily on analysing its problems, yet good analysis rarely reaches those who decide in a form they can use, and is seldom understood by the public whose consent they need.

The splintering of political economy. Adam Smith treated political economy as a branch of the science of the statesman or legislator (Smith 1776). It has since divided into economics, political science and public policy, three conversations that communicate poorly (Marshall 1890; Lasswell 1951). Tractable models have repeatedly treated uncertainty, whose probabilities cannot be known, as though it were measurable risk (Knight 1921).

The preparation of those who govern. Of thirteen Russell Group public-policy programmes that we have reviewed, only those at Oxford, Cambridge and the LSE require standard micro- and macroeconomic reasoning, and a majority require no economics at all; on our reading, the subject's first national benchmark statement is silent on political economy (QAA 2025).

Rights detached from duties. Rights carry reciprocal duties: to treat others as ends and never merely as means (Kant 1785), to refrain from harming others (Mill 1859), and to defend the institutions of an open society (Popper 1945). Shorn of those duties, liberal democracy shrinks to procedure, and the assertion of rights becomes a zero-sum contest.

These are the causes that the Initiative is designed to address. We hold ourselves to the test we apply to others: if the failures we cite prove idiosyncratic rather than recurrent, or their causes prove to lie in external shocks rather than in deficits of capability and understanding, our premise fails, and we will say so.

References

  • Bank of England (2023) 'Financial stability buy/sell tools: a gilt market case study', Quarterly Bulletin.

  • Corlett, A. (2016) Examining an Elephant: Globalisation and the Lower Middle Class of the Rich World. London: Resolution Foundation. Resolution Foundation

  • Kant, I. (1785) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.

  • Knight, F. H. (1921) Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

  • Lakner, C. and Milanovic, B. (2013) 'Global income distribution: from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the Great Recession', Policy Research Working Paper 6719. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/1813-9450-6719

  • Lasswell, H. D. (1951) 'The policy orientation', in D. Lerner and H. D. Lasswell (eds) The Policy Sciences. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

  • Lawrence, M., Janzwood, S. and Homer-Dixon, T. (2022) What Is a Global Polycrisis? Technical Paper 2022-4. Cascade Institute.

  • Lawrence, M. et al. (2024) 'Global polycrisis: the causal mechanisms of crisis entanglement', Global Sustainability 7, e6. doi:10.1017/sus.2024.1

  • Marshall, A. (1890) Principles of Economics. London: Macmillan.

  • Mill, J. S. (1859) On Liberty. London: John W. Parker.

  • Newman, N. et al. (2024) Digital News Report 2024. Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Reuters Institute

  • Office for Budget Responsibility (2026) Fiscal Risks and Sustainability, July.

  • Office for National Statistics (2026) Public Sector Finances, UK: September 2026.

  • Office for Students (2026) Financial Sustainability of Higher Education Providers in England, OfS 2026.21.

  • Popper, K. R. (1945) The Open Society and Its Enemies. London: Routledge.

  • QAA (2025) Subject Benchmark Statement: Public Policy and Public Administration.

  • Ross Arguedas, A., Robertson, C. T., Fletcher, R. and Nielsen, R. K. (2022) Echo Chambers, Filter Bubbles, and Polarisation: A Literature Review. Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism.

  • Smith, A. (1776) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London.

  • Toffler, A. (1980) The Third Wave. New York: William Morrow.

  • Wike, R. and Fetterolf, J. (2024) 'Satisfaction with democracy has declined in recent years in high-income nations', Pew Research Center, 18 June.

Previous: Introduction to the Aurelius Initiative · Contents · Next: The Initiative's elements